Slower is not always better: response-time evidence clarifies the limited role of miserly information processing in the Cognitive Reflection Test. by Stupple, Edward J.N. et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Slower is not always better: Response-time
evidence clarifies the limited role of miserly
information processing in the Cognitive
Reflection Test
Edward J. N. Stupple1*, Melanie Pitchford2, Linden J. Ball3, Thomas E. Hunt1,
Richard Steel4
1 Centre for Psychological Research, University of Derby, Derby, United Kingdom, 2 Department of
Psychology, University of Bedfordshire, Luton, United Kingdom, 3 School of Psychology, University of
Central Lancashire, Preston, United Kingdom, 4 School of Sport, Exercise & Health Sciences, Loughborough
University, Loughborough, United Kingdom
* e.j.n.stupple@derby.ac.uk
Abstract
We report a study examining the role of ‘cognitive miserliness’ as a determinant of poor per-
formance on the standard three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). The cognitive miserli-
ness hypothesis proposes that people often respond incorrectly on CRT items because of
an unwillingness to go beyond default, heuristic processing and invest time and effort in
analytic, reflective processing. Our analysis (N = 391) focused on people’s response times
to CRT items to determine whether predicted associations are evident between miserly
thinking and the generation of incorrect, intuitive answers. Evidence indicated only a weak
correlation between CRT response times and accuracy. Item-level analyses also failed to
demonstrate predicted response-time differences between correct analytic and incorrect
intuitive answers for two of the three CRT items. We question whether participants who give
incorrect intuitive answers on the CRT can legitimately be termed cognitive misers and
whether the three CRT items measure the same general construct.
Introduction
Dual-process theories of thinking [1–4] propose the existence of a dissociation between intui-
tive, heuristic thought (which typically arises rapidly) and more effortful, analytic thought
(which is typically deployed more slowly). The convention following Evans [2] is to refer to
heuristic processes as ‘Type 1’ and to analytic processes as ‘Type 2’. In this paper, we use the
Type 1/Type 2 and heuristic/analytic distinctions interchangeably. In testing the assumptions
of dual-process theories a variety of tasks have been devised that have the potential to engender
within-participant conflicts between heuristic and analytic processes. Such ‘conflict’ tasks are
often associated with increased response times relative to equivalent tasks that do not engender
heuristic/analytic conflicts (e.g., [5–7]). Furthermore, evidence has also clarified that the
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sensitivity to conflict items that is manifested in response times is often correlated with an
individual’s propensity to apply analytic or calculative thinking (e.g., [8–11]).
Key examples of heuristic/analytic conflict tasks are the three items that make up the Cogni-
tive Reflection Test (CRT [12]; see Table 1), which has taken the reasoning literature by storm
over the past decade as a test-bed for examining dual-process theories. The CRT was devised
to assess the ability of participants to resist tempting heuristic or ‘intuitive’ answers and to
engage in analytic or ‘reflective’ reasoning to reach correct responses that conflict with intui-
tive responses. The most well-known item from the CRT is the ‘bat and ball’ problem, which
reads as follows: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost? ____cents”. The common but incorrect answer to this problem is 10
cents, with this response being believed to be generated automatically by intuitive processes. In
contrast, arriving at the correct response of 5 cents is generally assumed to require the inhibi-
tion of the intuitive response in favour of more careful and deliberative checking and analysis
(see [13] for evidence of transcranial direct current stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex disabling this inhibitory mechanism).
The CRT has a number of key advantages for examining reasoning performance over many
other tasks, which perhaps underscore its popularity. First, there are no controversies over the
appropriate normative (i.e., arithmetic) standards against which to judge performance (cf.
[14]), unlike the situation for most other tasks in the reasoning, judgment and decision making
literature (see [15,16]). Second, the CRT is a very easy test to administer to participants and is
not time-consuming for participants to complete. Third, the CRT appears to be a very consis-
tent predictor of normative responding across many other measures of judgment and choice
(e.g., see [17]).
Overall, people tend to perform poorly on the three items of the CRT, with Pennycook,
Cheyne, Koehler, and Fugelsang [18] noting that both web-based and typical university sam-
ples produce means in the range of 0.5 to 1 items correct out of 3, whilst students at elite uni-
versities such as Princeton and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology yield higher means
in the range of 1.5 to 2 items correct. The difficulty of the CRT is consistent with the assump-
tions of dual-process theories in that low scores on the test suggest that rapidly-accessible,
intuitive answers derived through Type 1 processing dominate responding for a majority of
reasoners, with a sufficient level of Type 2 processing only being engaged for a minority of
respondents so as to enable the derivation of effective solutions by means of effortful
reflection.
Cognitive miserliness, rational thinking and the CRT
In examining the link between performance on the CRT and other cognitive abilities, research-
ers have frequently demonstrated positive correlations between CRT scores and normatively
accurate performance on a wide range of tasks from the judgment and decision-making litera-
ture (e.g., [12,19–27]). Furthermore, Toplak et al. [27] have observed that not only does the
Table 1. The Cognitive Reflection Test.
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball
cost? _____ cents. (Correct response = 5 cents; Intuitive response = 10 cents).
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100
widgets? _____ minutes. (Correct response = 5 minutes; Intuitive response = 100 minutes).
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the
patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? _____ days.
(Correct response = 47 days; Intuitive response = 24 days).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0186404.t001
Response times and the Cognitive Reflection Test
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CRT predict substantial variance in judgment and decision-making tasks that require ‘rational
thinking’, but that it does so independently of measures of intelligence, executive functioning
and thinking dispositions. This observation led Toplak et al. [27] to claim that poor scores on
the CRT are an index of cognitive miserliness [28], that is, an unwillingness to go beyond
default, heuristic processing and invest the requisite cognitive effort to solve the problem (see
also [28]).
As Toplak et al. [27,28] note, the theme of cognitive miserliness in information processing
has dominated judgment and decision-making research for over 40 years. As a case in point,
Toplak et al. [27] refer to Kahneman and Frederick’s [29] discussion of ‘attribute substitution’
as a common mechanism used to lighten cognitive load. Such attribute substitution occurs
when a person needs to assess attribute A but finds that assessing attribute B (correlated with
attribute A) is cognitively easier such that they default to using attribute B instead. In other
words, an easier question is substituted for a harder one. De Neys, Rossi, and Houde´ [30] have
explicitly evoked attribute substitution as an explanation of the bat and the ball problem on the
CRT, suggesting that when participants complete tasks such as the bat and ball problem they
substitute the given problem for an alternative, simpler version, in this case understanding the
task as saying that “The bat costs $1” rather than what is actually stated (i.e., “The bat costs $1
more than the ball”).
In alignment with the cognitive miserliness hypothesis, De Neys et al. [30] demonstrated
diminished confidence ratings on the bat and ball problem by those participants who gave the
10 cents response (see [31] for similar evidence using the bat and the ball problem and a ‘feel-
ing of error’ measure). De Neys et al. [30] interpret this finding as showing that participants
are not simply providing intuitive but incorrect responses to this CRT item in blissful igno-
rance, but rather offer the intuitive response despite having some awareness of its questionable
nature and their possible misrepresentation of the problem. This failure to consider alternative
responses or engage analytic thinking even in the face of reduced confidence in one’s answer
does seem to be indicative of cognitive miserliness.
Thinking dispositions and the CRT
Although there is reasonable evidence triangulating on the view that poor scores on the CRT
index cognitive miserliness, there are also suggestions in the literature that the case is more
complex than this. Indeed, despite Toplak et al.’s [27] evidence that the CRT predicts rational
thinking performance independent of self-reported thinking dispositions (i.e., the willingness
to engage Type 2 thinking), some researchers nevertheless claim that thinking dispositions
may play an important causal role in CRT success. One view (e.g., [21,32–34]), is that success-
ful CRT performance relies, at least in part, on Actively Open-Minded Thinking (e.g., [35–
37]), including the search for alternative responses. For example, Campitelli and Gerrans [33]
present a model of CRT performance in which both Actively Open-Minded Thinking and
numeric ability are key determinants of CRT success.
Another view (e.g., [38]) is that success on the CRT indexes an ‘analytic cognitive style’,
that is, a propensity to think analytically—although it is not entirely clear to what extent this
idea is conceptually distinct from Toplak et al.’s [27,28] view that success on the CRT is highly
predictive of ‘rational thinking’. Arguably, however, the notion of an analytic cognitive style is
more generic and encompassing than that of the somewhat narrower concept of rational
thinking, which adds to its appeal. Such conceptual breadth also resonates with recent evi-
dence showing that the CRT is predictive of a wide range of outcome measures that relate to
beliefs, values and skills that are not conventionally associated with research on judgment and
decision making. Such outcome measures encompass religious disbelief, paranormal disbelief,
Response times and the Cognitive Reflection Test
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less traditional moral values, enhanced scientific understanding and reasoning, belief in evolu-
tion, improved creative problem solving, less reliance on Smartphone technology as an infor-
mation source and reduced receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit (see [39] for a review).
Numeracy skills, cognitive ability and the CRT
Toplak and colleagues’ emphasis on the value of the CRT in providing a measure of cognitive
miserliness means that these researchers have, at times, seemed to downplay the extent to
which the CRT might also assess so-called mindware gaps (e.g., the lack of the necessary cogni-
tive rules, strategies, or belief systems to behave rationally [40]), with such mindware gaps
being distinct from miserly information processing. For example, in their earlier research on
the CRT, Toplak et al. [27,28] appear to view the CRT’s predictive power for rational thinking
as being largely separable from constructs such as cognitive ability and intelligence as well as
from underpinning mechanisms such as executive functioning and working memory. We
note, for example, that whilst Toplak et al. [27] agree that mindware gaps represent an impor-
tant class of reasoning error in judgment and decision-making tasks they nevertheless state
that, “The potency of the CRT as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks cer-
tainly does not derive from its ability to assess knowledge gaps, because it clearly does no such
thing” (p. 1284, emphasis added).
However, because the CRT consists of mathematics problems it would be curious if
numeric ability was not important for successful performance. Indeed, we have already noted
that the model presented by Campitelli and Gerrans [33] demonstrated that numeric ability
plays a significant role in CRT performance in addition to other factors. Recent research by
Sinayev and Peters [41] likewise claims that numeric ability seems to be a key mechanism that
explains the observed association between CRT performance and normatively successful deci-
sion making, although they additionally note that the ability to detect and correct intuitions is
also relevant to explaining the way in which the CRT is a predictor of effective decision
making.
This emerging body of evidence for the ‘numeracy hypothesis’ in relation to the CRT sug-
gests that mindware gaps may be more important for poor performance on the test than previ-
ously considered. For example, someone with poor numeracy skills would be unlikely to
perform well on the CRT irrespective of their cognitive effort. The possession of appropriate
mindware may not only be consequential for CRT success but also for its capacity to predict
judgment and decision-making performance. These points have been supported by Stanovich,
West, and Toplak [42] in their recent writing, where they directly acknowledge that CRT mea-
sures have at least moderate mindware dependence. As they note, “. . .even the simple bat-
and-ball problem will be affected by the differential instantiation of numeracy skills. That
some people find math calculations to be second nature while others do not will affect how
easy the problem is” ([42] pp. 115–116).
Consistent with the view that cognitive ability and mindware are important in the CRT we
also note Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, and Hamilton’s [43] recent proposal that the stan-
dard CRT may only be an effective measure of cognitive reflection in highly educated adults,
whereas a wider range of item difficulty is needed to measure cognitive reflection in more het-
erogeneous samples. Thus, we suggest, the CRT may mislabel participants as cognitive misers
when they struggle on the CRT when instead of being miserly they have poor levels of available
working memory capacity or limited cognitive inhibition.
Thompson et al. [44] have also examined issues relating to cognitive ability and the CRT
in a series of studies examining the possibility of priming deliberative thinking on CRT items
by means of a ‘processing disfluency’ manipulation (see [45] [46]). In line with previous
Response times and the Cognitive Reflection Test
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disfluency research (e.g., [45]), Thompson et al. [44] demonstrated that a degraded presenta-
tion of the CRT slowed participants down, which is suggestive of efforts at increased analytic
thinking and the converse of cognitive miserliness. However, such slower responses were not
generally associated with enhanced correct responding, with evidence in two experiments
instead indicating that only certain sub-groups comprised of more cognitively able partici-
pants (as indexed by their SAT scores) were capable of benefitting from the disfluency manip-
ulation. Thompson et al.’s [44] observations therefore implicate a role for cognitive ability in
relation to the CRT, with higher-ability participants benefiting from the triggering of Type 2,
reflective processing, although Meyer et al. [47] advance a more cautious position on this
evidence.
Notwithstanding the uncertainty regarding the interaction between disfluency manipula-
tions and SAT ability for enhanced performance on the CRT there are other recent lines of
research that separately implicate cognitive ability metrics as being important for CRT success.
For example, Stupple, Gale, and Richmond [48] found in two experiments that variation in
working memory capacity (as measured using a composite score derived from Operation
Span, Symmetry Span and Reading Span; see [49]) was a strong predictor of CRT perfor-
mance, whereas the variation in response times to syllogistic reasoning problems that had
been devised specifically to evoke a heuristic/analytic conflict was seen to be non-predictive of
CRT success. Stupple et al.’s [48] findings run counter to a cognitive miserliness hypothesis in
relation to the CRT inasmuch as increased processing times for syllogisms have previously
been seen to be associated with more normative responding on these deductive arguments
(e.g., [10,11]) and would therefore also be expected to be predictive of successful CRT
performance.
Stupple et al. [48] argue that while cognitive miserliness may play a role in CRT perfor-
mance, in order to solve the items correctly participants must nevertheless possess both the
requisite working memory capacity and the relevant mindware, including numeracy skills.
Stupple et al. [48] also suggest that some participants tackling the CRT might be better charac-
terised as cognitive wastrels rather than cognitive misers because they appear to expend consid-
erable cognitive effort engaged in a misdirected strategy that does not yield the correct
response and that may not yield the incorrect intuitive response either.
In line with Stupple et al.’s [48] observations we also note that some researchers have
recently recognised the value of scoring ‘other’ incorrect responses that are distinct from the
standard ‘intuitive’ incorrect responses. For example, Pennycook et al. [18] derive various per-
formance measures for the CRT, including the following: (1) CRT-Reflective, which is a partici-
pant’s total number of correct responses out of a maximum of 3; (2) CRT-Intuitive, which is a
participant’s total number of incorrect intuitive responses out of a maximum of 3; and (3)
CRT-PI, which is the proportion of intuitive incorrect answers out of all incorrect responses
made by a participant, some of which may be non-intuitive incorrect responses (i.e., ‘other’
incorrect answers).
This latter measure has been claimed to help address statistical issues that might otherwise
structurally confound CRT-Reflective and CRT-Intuitive scoring (see [18] for details). In their
analysis, Pennycook et al. [18] observed that the correlation between CRT-Intuitive and a self-
report measure of intuitiveness (i.e., Faith in Intuition) was not especially robust. In addition,
the correlation between the CRT-PI and Faith in Intuition was not reliable as either an aggre-
gate measure or at the item level. These results call into question the CRT as a measure of peo-
ple’s tendency to rely on ‘intuitive’ responding (see [18] for further discussion, and [50], for
related evidence). By implication, these findings seem to raise additional concerns about the
validity of using the CRT as a measure of miserly information processing.
Response times and the Cognitive Reflection Test
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Aims of the experiment
In summary, we argue that while it is likely that cognitive miserliness plays a role in CRT per-
formance (cf. [42]), there is a growing body of evidence that the cognitive miserliness construct
offers neither a sufficient account of performance on the test nor an effective explanation of
the strength of the test as a predictor of what Toplak et al. ([27,28] refer to as rational thinking,
or of what Pennycook et al. [18] designate as an analytic cognitive style. Furthermore, we sug-
gest that although much work has been done to examine the predictive power of the CRT as
well as modeling its underpinning cognitive factors, it is nevertheless the case that, to date, a
more basic analysis has tended to be neglected. More specifically, we note that the question of
whether CRT items are a good index of cognitive miserliness can be examined directly through
an analysis of people’s response times to the problems and the extent to which such response
times are associated with solution success.
In these latter respects we assume that a fairly pure cognitive miserliness account of the
CRT that acknowledges only minimal mindware dependence (e.g., relating to numeracy skills)
would predict that: (1) participants who devote the shortest times to solving CRT problems
should also generally be those who minimize their task engagement and opt for intuitive but
incorrect answers; and (2) participants who devote the longest times to solving the CRT prob-
lems would typically be those who avoid relying on miserly, intuitive processing and instead
expend effort in analytic processing in an often successful attempt to derive correct solutions.
Under these assumptions the expectation would be for a robust positive correlation between
the time taken on the three CRT problems and the total number of correct solutions, with
such a correlation clearly indicating convergent validity with the cognitive miserliness
construct.
In contrast to these predictions, if the cognitive miserliness account of the CRT is much
more limited in its explanatory scope then we would expect only a weak correlation between
response times and CRT success. We note that the breaking of the link between longer
response times and solution success could arise for three key reasons. First, as noted in our
introductory review, it is possible that people are motivated to try to solve CRT items and not
simply opt for the initial intuitive response, but that they lack the requisite mindware (e.g.,
numerical skills) to compute the correct answer. These individuals will have relatively long
response times but might either default to an intuitive response or compute an incorrect
response, either way diluting the correlation between response times and CRT success. Second,
some highly numerate participants might respond quickly and accurately to most or all CRT
items, this time weakening the correlation because their numeracy skills allow them to calcu-
late quickly and accurately. Third, people might engage in time-consuming analytic processing
that merely rationalises an incorrect, intuitive response. Because rationalisation is analytic in
its intent we would not view it as being miserly information processing, yet because such ratio-
nalisation takes time whilst leading to an incorrect, intuitive response it would again reduce
the correlation between response times and CRT success. We note that there is extensive evi-
dence for rationalisation increasing response times whilst also leading to default heuristic
responding for reasoning problems such as the Wason selection task (e.g., [51]; but see [52]for
a more nuanced view of the evidence).
We have noted above that some participants who lack the requisite mindware to solve the
CRT items might offer answers that are not consistent with either the incorrect intuitive or
the correct analytic response. To investigate this issue, we aimed to conduct item level analyses
for each CRT problem that contrasted the response times for the correct analytic and the
incorrect intuitive responses to that problem with a third category of answer, that is, incorrect
Response times and the Cognitive Reflection Test
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non-intuitive responses (cf. [18]). We hypothesised that these incorrect non-intuitive
responses should again take longer than the incorrect intuitive responses.
Method
Participants
Data were collected from 391 participants, comprising 304 undergraduates studying various
degree courses at Lancaster University (220 female, 84 male), and 87 undergraduates studying
for a psychology degree at the University of Derby (67 female and 16 male; 4 participants
declined to provide gender information). Participants were excluded if they were familiar with
the task and were replaced.
Design and materials
The three items of the Cognitive Reflection Test (Table 1) were presented to all participants via
Apple Macintosh computers (Lancaster University) and PC machines (University of Derby).
Responses for each item were recorded after participants had entered an answer in an on-
screen field and had then clicked on a button to move to the next screen. Response times for
each item reflected the total duration from its initial presentation to the submission of a
response.
Procedure
Ethical clearance was granted through the local ethics committees at Lancaster University and
Derby University prior to commencement of data collection. We confirm that participants
provided written consent and this consent procedure was approved by the local ethics commit-
tees at both Lancaster University and Derby University. Items were presented by computer
one at a time in a randomized order. On completion of all of the items participants were
thanked for taking part in the experiment and were given a printed debrief sheet. Any ques-
tions arising from the experiment or the debrief sheet were answered prior to participants
departing the experiment.
Data analysis
Data were analysed using SPSS Version 24. Response time data were positively skewed and
were therefore log10 transformed so as to meet the necessary requirements for parametric data
analysis using regression. This regression analysis used the log10 transformed response times
for each of the three separate CRT items to predict the overall CRT performance score. We fur-
ther note that for the item-based comparisons of response times for the different response
types the data failed to meet the assumptions for parametric analysis in terms of the absence of
either normal distributions or equal group sizes. As a consequence, we analysed these data
using non-parametric Kruskal Wallace tests and applied Bonferroni-adjusted Mann-Whitney
follow-up tests.
Results
The first analysis examined the association between the sum of participants’ response times
(log10 transformed to correct for violations of normality) for the three CRT items and the total
number of items responded to correctly (i.e., the CRT-Reflective measure described by Penny-
cook et al [18]). The correlation was positive and significant, r = .181, p< .001 (N = 391), as
predicted by the cognitive miserliness account, but the relationship was relatively small, indi-
cating that longer response times were only weakly associated with better CRT performance.
Response times and the Cognitive Reflection Test
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Note that the correlation between participants’ mean response times for the three CRT items
and the total number of items responded to correctly was equivalent to the one reported,
which involved total response times for the three CRT items. This relatively weak relationship
between correct performance and response times is readily apparent when CRT-Reflective
scores and total response-time data are depicted graphically as a dot plot (see Fig 1).
As a follow-up analysis a multiple regression was conducted to test the contribution that
log10 transformed response times for each of the CRT items made to predicting overall correct
responding for the three problems (i.e., the CRT-Reflective score). The regression model was
highly significant (see Table 2), but standardised regression coefficients for each problem type
showed differing relationships with overall correct responding. For the bat and ball item, lon-
ger response times were associated with increased overall performance, indicating that
increased response times to this item predicted correct responding overall. However, response
times to the widget problem did not significantly predict correct responses. Finally, the
response times for the lily pads problem indicated that reduced response times were signifi-
cantly associated with more correct responses overall.
Fig 1. Dot plot of the relationship between CRT-Reflective scores and total response times (natural data in
seconds).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0186404.g001
Response times and the Cognitive Reflection Test
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Pennycook et al. [18] propose that to examine miserly thinking in the CRT it is best to cal-
culate and examine intuitiveness scores (see Fig 2 for a dot plot depicting the relationship
between CRT-Intuitive scores and total response times). A further regression was conducted
that was structurally equivalent to that reported above, but which used Pennycook et al.’s
CRT-Intuitive score as the dependent variable, which is a participant’s total number of incor-
rect intuitive responses out of a maximum of 3. This model was again highly significant (see
Table 3). For the bat and ball item, shorter response times were associated with increased intui-
tive responding overall. However, response times to the widget problem, and response times
for the lily pads problem, did not significantly predict intuitive responding.
The readily apparent asymmetry between the regression models for the CRT-Reflective
score and the CRT-Intuitive score suggest that incorrect but non-intuitive responses may be
very important in explaining the relationship between response times and performance on the
CRT. To examine this issue further, we examined the response times for each of the three CRT
problems separately, having first designated a participant’s response to the item as being one
of three possible types: (1) correct analytic; (2) incorrect intuitive; or (3) incorrect non-
Table 2. Multiple regression of log10 transformed response times for CRT items as predictors of the CRT-Reflective score.
Regression Model R = .344, R2adj = .111 F(3, 387) = 17.28, p < .001
Predictors Standardized Beta Unstandardized Beta
Bat and Ball RT 0.344 1.143 t = 6.35, p < .001
Widget RT 0.073 0.230 t = 1.34, p = .182
Lily Pad RT -0.155 -0.572 t = -2.86, p = .004
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0186404.t002
Fig 2. Dot plot of the relationship between CRT-Intuitive scores and total response times (natural data
in seconds).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0186404.g002
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intuitive. Due to uneven sample sizes across groups non-parametric ANOVAs were con-
ducted. Median response times for each type of answer for the CRT items are shown in
Table 4, whilst Table 5 shows the frequency of each type of response across the CRT items.
For the bat and ball problem incorrect intuitive answers were the most common (259
responses) and incorrect non-intuitive answers were the least common (just 15 responses). In
terms of the response-time analysis, this demonstrated a highly significant difference across
response types, Kruskal Wallace H = 49.99, df = 2, p< .001. Post hoc Mann Whitney tests
(Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .017) indicated that the difference in response-times for correct
analytic and incorrect intuitive responses was highly significant and in line with cognitive
miser predictions (p< .001). Mann Whitney tests showed that there was no significant differ-
ence either between correct analytic and incorrect non-intuitive responses (p = .09) or between
incorrect intuitive and incorrect non-intuitive responses (p = .86), although these analyses
were potentially compromised by the small number of responses in the incorrect non-intuitive
category. In sum, the data for the bat and ball problem indicate that correct analytic responses
took longer to derive than incorrect intuitive responses (cf. Fig 3), which aligns with predic-
tions relating to cognitive miserliness dominating responding on this CRT item given that the
incorrect intuitive answers were also more frequent.
For the widget problem incorrect intuitive answers were again the most common (209
responses) and incorrect non-intuitive answers were the least common (63 responses),
although proportionally the latter were more prevalent for the widget problem than for other
CRT items, suggesting that with this problem a fairly sizeable subset of participants were
attempting to derive an analytic solution rather than defaulting to an intuitive one, but were
nevertheless unable to derive a correct response. The response-time analysis for the widget
Table 3. Multiple regression of log10 transformed response times for CRT items as predictors of the CRT-Intuitive score.
Regression Model R = .337, R2adj = .107 F (3, 387) = 16.52, p < .001
Predictors Standardized Beta Unstandardized Beta
Bat and Ball RT -0.330 -1.140 t = -6.08, p < .001
Widget RT -0.064 -0.230 t = -1.17, p = .241
Lily Pad RT 0.074 0.274 t = 1.37, p = .173
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0186404.t003
Table 4. Median response times in seconds (interquartile range in parenthesis) as a function of response type and CRT problem.
CRT Problem Response Type
Correct Analytic Incorrect Intuitive Incorrect Non-Intuitive
Bat and Ball 34.97 (36.64) 19.38 (14.96) 27.31 (42.74)
Widget 28.81 (32.38) 24.29 (20.98) 34.30 (44.20)
Lily Pads 28.19 (26.16) 24.95 (22.92) 50.63 (53.41)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0186404.t004
Table 5. Frequency of response type as a function of CRT problem (N = 391).
CRT Problem Response Type
Correct Analytic Incorrect Intuitive Incorrect Non-Intuitive
Bat and Ball 117 259 15
Widget 119 209 63
Lily Pads 163 179 49
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0186404.t005
Response times and the Cognitive Reflection Test
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problem demonstrated a significant difference across response types, Kruskal Wallace
H = 7.25, df = 2, p = .027 (see also Fig 4). However, post hoc Mann Whitney tests (Bonferroni
adjusted threshold alpha = .017) showed that this difference was not significant between cor-
rect analytic and incorrect intuitive responses (p = .09), which runs counter to cognitive miser-
liness predictions. There was also no difference in response times between correct analytic and
Fig 3. Dot plot of the relationship between response categories and response times (natural data in
seconds) for the bat and ball problem.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0186404.g003
Fig 4. Dot plot of the relationship between response categories and response times (natural data in
seconds) for the widget problem.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0186404.g004
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incorrect non-intuitive responses (p = .29), although incorrect non-intuitive responses did
take reliably longer than incorrect intuitive responses (p = .013).
For the lily pads problem, incorrect intuitive answers were again the most common (179
responses), although correct analytic responses were fairly frequent (163 responses) and com-
bined with incorrect non-intuitive responses (49 responses) indicated that overall a majority
of participants were attempting to derive analytic solutions for this item. Other researchers
have likewise observed that the lily pads problem tends to be evoke more analytic responding
that the other two items and is somewhat easier (e.g., [18,33]). The response-time analysis for
the lily pads problem again revealed a significant difference across response types, Kruskal
Wallace H = 31.61, df = 2, p< .001 (see also Fig 5). Post hoc Mann Whitney tests (Bonferroni
adjusted threshold alpha = .017) demonstrated that this difference was not significant between
correct analytic and incorrect intuitive responses (p = .25). However, incorrect non-intuitive
responses took reliably longer than both incorrect intuitive responses (p< .001) and correct
analytic responses (p< .001).
Finally, we examined the internal reliability of the CRT. The items showed an ’unaccept-
able’ level of reliability, Cronbach’s ά = .47.
Discussion
The results of this study reveal a weak but reliable correlation between CRT response times
and overall CRT accuracy. Although this evidence does not support a pure cognitive miserli-
ness account of CRT performance, it does, nevertheless, suggest that miserly information pro-
cessing is part of an explanation of solution errors on the CRT. If cognitive miserliness was the
primary explanation of CRT performance then one would expect a stronger pattern of positive
association between CRT response times and accuracy rates, with correct responses taking
time to be produced via analytic, Type 2 processing, and with incorrect intuitive responses
arising quickly via heuristic, Type 1 processing. Instead, our data suggest that several factors
are at play when participants complete the CRT.
Fig 5. Dot plot of the relationship between response categories and response times (natural data in
seconds) for the lily pads problem.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0186404.g005
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Further evidence against a pure cognitive miserliness hypothesis emerged from examining
individual CRT items. Regression analyses showed that although response times for the bat
and ball problem predicted overall successful CRT performance and were therefore consistent
with a cognitive miser account, this was not so for the widget problem. Most notably, faster
responses to the lily pads problem were predictive of better overall CRT performance, in oppo-
sition to what might be expected from a cognitive miser account. Furthermore, the item-level
analyses contrasting response times across response types (incorrect intuitive, incorrect non-
intuitive and correct analytic) also failed to demonstrate predicted differences between correct
analytic responses and incorrect intuitive responses for two of the three CRT problems, with
the exception again being the bat and ball problem.
Because these latter comparisons are not contaminated by responses times arising when
people respond non-intuitively but incorrectly, they represent a more clear-cut test of the cog-
nitive miserliness hypothesis than the weak correlation between response times and accuracy
rates. The observation that the predicted response-time difference between correct analytic
responses and incorrect intuitive responses was only evident for the bat and ball problem raises
questions about the validity of a pure cognitive miserliness explanation of poor CRT perfor-
mance. We note that a recent study by Travers, Rolinson, and Feeney [53], which examined
response times using an adapted version of Primi et al.’s [43] eight-item CRT, found that par-
ticipants took significantly longer to evaluate correct analytic answers relative to incorrect
intuitive ones when response-time data were analyzed at an aggregate level. However, since an
item-level analysis was not presented for this comparison it is uncertain to what extent the
observed effect was driven by differences arising for perhaps just a few items, such as the bat
and ball problem, as in the present study.
Travers et al.’s [53] study presents a fascinating and detailed analysis of responding on con-
flict and non-conflict versions of the CRT using a mouse-tracking methodology to capture the
time-course of processing. We note, however, that there are some non-standard aspects of
their mouse-tracking paradigm, which may render it difficult to draw clear-cut comparisons
with the standard presentation of the CRT, including the presentation of four response options
per problem. There are also more general concerns with what mouse-tracking data can legiti-
mately reveal regarding reasoning processes, which arise because of inherent methodological
artifacts that seriously bias response-time effects in ways that ultimately confound theoretical
interpretation, even producing effects that are opposite to these found using more sensitive
attentional measures such as eye-tracking analysis (for relevant discussion see [51,54–56].
Our data not only question whether participants who give incorrect intuitive answers to the
CRT can simply be referred to as cognitive misers, but also indicate that a sizeable minority of
incorrect responders (especially on the widget and lily pads problems) did not produce pre-
dicted intuitive answers. This observation again suggests that such individuals cannot be
labeled as cognitive misers since they are presumably engaging in analytic thinking, albeit ana-
lytic thinking that is not delivering a correct solution. Interestingly, participants who generated
the incorrect non-intuitive responses for the widget and lily pads problems also demonstrated
the longest response times for these items and may be best categorized as cognitive wastrels
[48], since they seem to be trying to compute a response whilst not possessing sufficient cogni-
tive abilities—numeric or otherwise—to derive an effective solution.
In this latter respect the present evidence suggests that some aspects of poor CRT perfor-
mance derive from a failure to compute the normative response because of mindware gaps
(e.g., in basic mathematical skills), which means that it is possible that the CRT also has the
capacity to assess such gaps on various other judgment and decision making tasks employed in
heuristics-and-biases research (e.g., tasks also involving fundamental numerical skills such as
ratio-bias problems; e.g., [57]). Indeed, we again note Sinayev and Peters’ [41] evidence that
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numeric ability is one of the key factors that explains the standard association observed
between CRT performance and successful responses on judgment and decision-making tasks.
Returning to our finding that two CRT items failed to engender predicted response-time
differences between correct analytic responses and incorrect intuitive responses—as expected
by a cognitive miserliness account—we suggest that at the very least these data raise concerns
about the internal reliability of the CRT in terms of whether the items measure the same
general construct. The Cronbach’s alpha we observed was at an unacceptable level and not
dissimilar to that seen in previous studies (e.g., Teovanović and colleagues [58], reported a
Cronbach’s ά of .39). Indeed, Toplak et al. [28] have themselves commented that from the
standpoint of reliability “three items is obviously too few” (p. 150), which has, in part, inspired
them to validate a seven-item version of the CRT. We also note Teovanović et al.’s [58]
research examining the factor structure of a range of cognitive biases, which found that while
the standard three-item CRT correlated well with some of the individual tasks it did not load
significantly onto any factors identified as explaining variance in these cognitive biases. Teova-
nović et al. argue that this outcome might be because of a lack of internal consistency between
CRT items.
If different CRT items are measuring different cognitive and dispositional constructs, then
this has major implications for how the CRT is interpreted and utilised and warrants further
investigation. In this respect, we applaud the development of extended versions of the CRT
([28,43,59]) given that these have a broader focus, increase the range of possible scores, reduce
the confounding influence of numeracy and include items that some less cognitively able indi-
viduals can solve. Our own data, which indicate that some participants may have engaged in
misdirected analytic thinking on standard CRT items, suggest that the efforts by Primi et al.
[43] to measure reflective thinking in less able participants are especially welcome.
In terms of the internal reliability of the standard three-item CRT, we suggest that the bat
and ball problem appears to be the most convincing candidate for measuring cognitive miser-
liness, with the other two items appearing not to measure cognitive miserliness at all. Cer-
tainly, for the lily pads problem there is little or no calculation that needs to be done to
produce the correct solution. The lily pads doubling in area each day simply requires the reali-
zation that the lily pads would be at half their final extent the day before the lake is completely
covered, which contrasts markedly with the bat and ball problem, where realizing that 10 cents
is not the correct answer requires the application of some (albeit basic) algebra, whereby can-
didate values for the ball are tested. We would argue that this is an example of the kind of sus-
tained ‘decoupling’ that Stanovich and Toplak [60] describe as a necessary criterion for Type 2
processing. It is also noteworthy in relation to the lily pads problem that if participants do
engage in a misdirected calculative strategy from the outset then they often invest a substantial
amount of time in reaching an incorrect answer. In this respect, the lily pads problem may
best be categorized as an ‘insight’ problem that hinges on a restructured representation of the
given information. Indeed, an earlier version of the problem studied by Schooler, Ohlsson,
and Brooks [61] was described in such terms.
A final question to address given our concerns with the reliability of CRT items as a mea-
sure of cognitive miserliness relates to the matter of what participants are doing when they
take a median of around 19 to 25 seconds on these items only thence to generate an incorrect
intuitive response. We note that this important question is not directly addressed by Travers
et al. [53] in relation to their findings regarding the time-course of processing on the CRT.
This is despite their observation that the average time to provide the incorrect intuitive
response to CRT items involving a heuristic/analytic conflict was a lengthy 21 seconds, which
is closely aligned with the median response time observed in the present study for incorrect
intuitive answers. These relatively slow responses seem to support aspects of De Neys et al.’s
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(e.g., [30]) theoretical perspective, which proposes that although participants may be uncon-
vinced by their initial, intuitive answer to a CRT item such that analytic Type 2 reasoning
might be triggered, they may also lack the requisite mindware to solve the problem and still
default to an intuitive response without engaging Type 2 analytic thinking, albeit with a sense
of doubt as to the validity of their answer. Presumably, this uncertainty takes time to be
resolved, thereby extending response times even though the eventual answer that is proffered
in the incorrect intuitive one. It is also possible that these participants do strive to resolve the
uncertainly through analytic processing (which takes time), but because of the inherent pro-
cessing demands of this analytic thinking the intuitive response is defaulted to as a form of
‘computational escape hatch’ [62–64]. In explaining the long response times for incorrect intu-
itive responses, we also reiterate here the possibility that people might engage in time-consum-
ing analytic processing that ends up merely rationalising the intuitive response.
We note that all of these explanations for relatively long processing times for incorrect intu-
itive answers on the CRT arise through analytic, Type 2 processes and not because of miserly
information processing. More generally, it is important to note that the relationship between
responses and response times is not always straightforward and that ‘slowness’ has been argued
to be an incidental correlate of Type 2 processing rather than a necessary criterion [3,60].
However, it is difficult to argue that when a participant is investing more time in responding
to an item they are being miserly, even if they are attempting to come up with a post hoc ratio-
nale for an erroneous response. Similarly, it is difficult to see how responses derived from
autonomous processes might be consistently slower than those derived from the sustained
decoupling of problems from hypothetical solutions. It should also be noted that the dual-pro-
cess explanation of the CRT, while dominant in the literature, is not universally endorsed (see
[65,66], for critical perspectives on dual-process theory).
In conclusion, we contend that although the CRT is widely assumed to be an effective mea-
sure of cognitive miserliness, our findings indicate that it is prudent not to make this assump-
tion uncritically. Indeed, we see grounds for viewing two of the three items used on the CRT as
being poor measures of cognitive miserliness, which may undermine the internal reliability of
the CRT as a whole. We would suggest that researchers using the CRT to measure miserliness
would do well to find some approach to eliminate spurious variance arising from responses
that are neither correct analytic answers nor incorrect intuitive answers, since in many cases
these incorrect non-intuitive responses are not miserly. In this respect, we welcome the emer-
gence of alternative scoring approaches in the CRT literature [18,41]. Moreover, we consider it
to be judicious for researchers to continue to use measures of cognitive disposition such as the
Need for Cognition Scale [67], the Rational Experiential Inventory [68] and the Actively Open
Minded Thinking Scale [36,37], since these self-report measures afford useful insights into
how participants experience their own cognitive processes. Without such measures we may
conflate cognitive wastrels, whose performance could be ameliorated through training, with
genuine cognitive misers, who elect not to be analytic and who may not be amenable to train-
ing interventions.
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